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COMMENTS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EMPLOYEES IN DUAL
ACrIVITY
GORDON F. CRANDALL
The recent case of Muck v. Snokomish County PUD presented an
issue involving the compulsory coverage of the Industrial Insurance
Act,' more commonly known as Workmen's Compensation, which has
been a confusing question in several other cases, and does not yet
seem to be finally resolved. There an employee was a sales manager for
an electrical appliance store, and his occupation as such did not bring
him under the compulsory provisions of the Act. No industrial insur-
ance premiums were paid for his time. On the day of his death, he ac-
companied the serviceman to a customer's house where they were to in-
stall a television set and erect a temporary outside antenna. This work
is included by the statute as "extrahazardous" work, and comes under
the compulsory provisions of the Act. While Muck was holding the an-
tenna for the serviceman it came in contact with high tension wires
maintained by the defendant, and Muck was electrocuted. His widow
sued the defendant for negligently causing her husband's death, and as
a defense to this action the defendant contended that Muck was en-
gaged in covered employment at the time of his death and therefore his
widow was foreclosed from suing at common law under the immunity
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.' Muck was found not
to be covered by the Act; therefore, the action in tort could be main-
tained.
To point up this problem which is the topic of this comment, a brief
reference to the facts of an older case will be helpful. In Everett v. De-
partment of Labor and Industries,' Everett was the resident manager
and supervisor of the waterworks, and his duties included operating the
plant, and also collecting the accounts due the company. On the day
of his death he was in a local card room, attempting to collect an old
" 41 Wn.2d 81, 247 P.2d 233 (1952).
2 RCW 51. [RRS § 7673].
8 RCW 51.24.010 [RRS § 7675].
4167 Wash. 619, 9 P.2d 1107 (1932).
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account from a customer of the waterworks. When he accused the cus-
tomer of pilfering water, Everett was shot and killed. Everett's widow
was held to be entitled to compensation under the Industrial Insurance
Act.
At first glance, these two cases seem to be curious interpretations of
the Workmen's Compensation Act. In the Muck case the employee
would appear to have been engaged in covered work, and was killed by
one of the hazards which prompted the legislature to include such work
under the compulsory provisions of the Act. On the other hand, Ev-
erett would appear to be doing work which was not covered by the Act,
and was killed by a hazard not at all peculiar to the operation of a
waterworks. These two cases demonstrate that when an employee is
engaged in two kinds of work, one of which is covered and the other not,
the question of his coverage at the time of injury or death is an im-
portant issue for two reasons: (1) coverage is a defense to an action
in tort against his employer or a third person employer who is also en-
gaged in covered work, and (2) coverage determines the employee's
right to compensation from the state accident fund. The reasoning be-
hind the two decisions will be discussed later in this comment.
In a great many businesses the employer may have two or more de-
partments or operations, some of which are within the compulsory cov-
erage of the Act and some of which are not. Further, a single employee's
duties may be varied, and his employment may include duties in more
than one of the employer's operations or departments.5 The employee
may be regularly engaged in covered employment for part of his work-
ing time, or may perform such work only occasionally as part of his
duties. It is the purpose of this comment to discuss the cases presenting
this problem and to suggest statutory changes which would diminish
the uncertainty in determining the right to compensation with its cor-
responding abolition of tort action when such an employee is injured
in the course of his employment.
Four sections of the Workmen's Compensation Act are material in
determining a particular employee's right to compensation. The persons
covered are the employees engaged in the enumerated or covered work,
and these persons are denominated workmen. Their right to compen-
sation is established in RCW 51.32.010 [RRS § 7679) "Each workman
injured in the course of his employment, or his family or dependents
5 Also, one employee may work for two employers, one of whom is engaged in cov-
ered work and the other in non-covered work. Lunday v. Department of Labor and In-
dustries, 200 Wash. 620, 94, P.2d 744 (1939).
(AUGUST
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
in case of death of the workman, shall receive out of the accident fund
compensation in accordance with this chapter, and except in this title
otherwise provided, such payment shall be in lieu of any and all rights
of action whatsoever against any person whomsoever:..."
A workman is defined in the Act as including "... every person in
this state who is engaged in the employment of an employer under this
title, whether by way of manual labor or. otherwise in the course of his
employment; . . ." (italics supplied)6
As this definition refers to the term "employer," an examination of
the definition of that word becomes necessary. An employer is defined
as "... any person, body of persons, corporate or otherwise. all while
engaged in this state in any extrahazardous work, by way of trade
or business,.. ." (italics supplied)'
Because this definition uses the word "extrahazardous," the mean-
ing of that term must be established. The Act states that: "There is
a hazard in all employment, but certain employments have come to
be, and to be recognized as being inherently hazardous works and
occupations, and it is the purpose to embrace all of them.. in tkhe
following enumeration, and they are intended to be embraced within
,the term 'extrahazardous' wherever used in this act, to-wit.. ." (italics
supplied) I
There follows an enumeration of industries and occupations covered
by the Act. In addition, the Director of Labor and Industries has the
power, after notice and hearing, to include other occupations not enu-
merated by the statute within the compulsory provisions of the Act.,
Even though a particular occupation is in fact a very dangerous one,
it is not "extrahazardous" unless it is listed by the statute or included
by the Department of Labor and Industries1
Considering these four sections of the Act together, we find that the
persons covered by the Act are "workmen" who work for an "employ-
er" engaged in "extrahazardous" work. It appears to have been the
6RCW 51.08.180 ERRS § 7674-1] " . . also every person in this state who is
engaged in the employment of or who is working under an independent contract, the
essence of which is his personal labor for an employer under this title, whether by
way of manual labor or otherwise, in the course of his employment."
T RCW 51.08.070 [RRS § 7675] " . or who contracts with one or more workmen,
the essence of which is the personal labor of such workman or workmen, in extra-
hazardous work."8 RCW 51.12.010 ERRS § 7674a].
9 RCW 51.12.040 ERRS § 7674]. There are also elective coverage provisions. RCW
51.12.110 ERRS § 7679].10 Parker v. Pantages, 143 Wash. 176, 254 Pac. 1083 (1927).
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original intention of the Act to include certain employers and the per-
sons entitled to compensation were to be those who worked for these
employers, regardless of the nature of their duties, and regardless of
the fact that they might not be in a proximate relation to the ordinary
hazards of the business when injured.
Coverage of a particular employee under this approach would be
relatively easy to determine. His right to compensation would depend
on the general nature of the employer's business, premiums would be
paid for all of his time, and his right to benefits would accrue without
regard to the nature of his work at the time of his injury, so long as
he was in the course of employment at the time. On the other hand,
a man employed by an employer not enumerated by the statute nor
included by the Director, but who performed work in an occupation so
enumerated, would not be entitled to compensation. For convenience,
this will be called the "employer's business" approach to coverage. As
stated, this appears to have been the original statutory approach to
determination of the right to compensation.
The interpretation of statutes depends, however, on decisions. Three
years after the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1911 was enacted, the
question of compulsory coverage of employees arose in Wendt v. Ind.
Ins. Comm.,.1 where a carpenter was employed by a department store.
A department store as a business was not within the coverage of the
Act, but the store maintained a repair shop with a carpenter's bench
and some power machinery Wendt, the carpenter, was killed when he
attempted to turn on the electric current to start the grindstone to
sharpen a chisel. The claim of Wendt's widow was denied by the Indus-
trial Insurance Commission (now the Department of Labor and In-
dustries), but was allowed by the superior court. On appeal, the com-
mission urged that Wendt's widow did not qualify for compensation
since Wendt was employed by a department store, whose principal busi-
ness was not listed as "extrahazardous" by the Act. The "employer's
business" approach was rejected by the court, and it was indicated that
coverage and the right of compensation would be found: "If the em-
ployer conducts any department of his business, whether large or small,
as an extra hazardous business within the meaning and defined terms
of this Act, 12 As Wendt had been employed in a "workshop where
1180 Wash. 111, 141 Pac. 311 (1914).
12 Id at 117, 141 Pac. at 313.
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power machinery is used"'" he was covered by the Act and his widow
was entitled to compensation for his death.
With this case and State v. Business Property Security," which held
that such employers must contribute to the accident fund for employees
working in covered departments of a generally non-covered business, it
became clear that the general nature of the employer's business was not
necessarily the controlling factor in determining coverage of a particu-
lar employee. Rejecting the "employer's business" approach, suggested
by the Act, the court began to look to the actual duties of the particular
employee to determine whether he qualified as a "workman" and, con-
sequently, for the benefits of the Act. The statutes defining "workman"
and "employer" have not been changed in this respect, and the statute
appears to take one approach while the cases take another."
Since the Wendt and Business Property Security cases, the existence
of two approaches to compulsory coverage has engendered a great deal
of confusion in the later decisions. In several cases, an employee actual-
ly engaged in an occupation or work enumerated by the statute at the
time of his injury has been denied compensation on the ground that his
employer was not engaged in that occupation as a trade or business."
In others employees engaged in one of the enumerated occupations have
recovered compensation despite the fact that their employer's business
was not enumerated by the statute nor included by the Department of
Labor and Industries.' The fact that this split exists indicates a need
for a re-examination of this question of compulsory coverage, to the
end that a consistent approach will be used in all cases.
The problem is further confused by the enumeration of works and
Is RCW 51.12.010 [RRS § 7674a].
14 87 Wash. 627, 152 Pac. 334 (1915).
5 These definitions have been amended m other respect, m an effort to include in-
dependent contractors. See supra, notes 6 and 7.
'aDingman v. Department of Labor and Industries, 157 Wash. 336, 288 Pac. 921
(1930) ; Edwards v. Department of Labor and Industries, 146 Wash. 266, 262 Pac. 973
(1928); Johnson v. Department of Labor and Industries, 182 Wash. 351, 47 P2d 6
1935), LaPoint v. Pacific Coast Strappers, 169 Wash. 71, 13 P.2d 71 (1932) ; Thomp-
son v. Department of Labor and Industries, 194 Wash. 396, 78 P.2d 170 (1938),
Guerrieri v. Industrial Insurance Commission, 84 Wash. 266, 146 Pac. 608 (1915),
Carsten v. Department of Labor and Industris, 172 Wash. 51, 19 P2d 133 (1933).
17 Wendt v. Industrial Insurance Commission, supra note 11, Berry v. Department
of Labor and Industries, 11 Wn2d 154, 118 P.2d 785 (1941), Replogle v. Seattle
School District No. 1, 84 Wash. 581, 147 Pac. 196 (1915), and see the approach used
in: Gowey v. Seattle Lighting Company, 108 Wash. 479, 184 Pac. 339 (1919) ; Muck v.
Snohomish County PUD, supra note 1; Amsbaugh v. Department of Labor and In-
dustries, 128 Wash. 692, 224 Pac. 18 (1924); Lmdquist v. Department of Labor and
Industries, 184 Wash. 194 50 P.2d 46 (1935); DeHaas v. Cascade Frozen Foods, 23
Wn2d 754, 162 P.2d 284 ?1945).
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occupations in the statute,' in which businesses of employers and ac-
tivities of employees are indiscriminately mixed together. For example,
the statute includes "gasworks, waterworks, reduction works, brew-
eries " and in the same list includes "installing and servicing radios
and electrical refrigerators," and "employees supplying service to the
public in hotels, clubs furnishing sleeping accommodations, apartment
hotels;" Of course, the statute does not provide compensation for a
business as such, but rather to the workmen employed in such a busi-
ness, but when this mixed approach to coverage is considered in con-
nection with the statutory definitions of "workman" and "employer,"
the ambiguity of the statute is obvious. To solve the analytical difficul-
ty, it must be said that when a particular employee is engaged in a cov-
ered occupation for an employer whose business is not covered, the em-
ployer himself is engaged in extrahazardous (covered) work as to that
employee by virtue of the fact that the employee is so engaged.
It is important to note at this point that the types of work and occu-
pations enumerated by RCW 51.12.010 [RRS 7674a], as well as other
occupations, are classified in RCW 51.20 [RRS 7676b] for the pur-
pose of determining the amount of the insurance premium payable by
the employer for each workman-hour. The court has on several occa-
sions used the language of these classifications, not for premium cal-
culation, but to determine the scope of coverage of the particular occu-
pation or work. For example, in Everett v. Department of Labor and
Industries,"9 the court used the words "waterworks, (operation)" found
in the premium classification section of the statute, to determine that
employees engaged in the "operation" of a waterworks were within the
Act. It is submitted that this method of determining the scope of cov-
erage is questionable, and that the statute including occupations or the
list of departmental inclusions should control coverage and the right
to compensation, rather than a breakdown of work catagories and oc-
cupations which is made for the purpose of computing contributions to
the accident fund.20 The statutory list of covered employments is very
brief and general, which is probably the reason why the court has found
it necessary to use these classifications to determine the scope of cover-
age.
The problem of determining the right to compensation is further
Is RCW 51.12.010 [RRS §7674a].
19 See note 4 supra.20 DeHaas v. Cascade Frozen Foods, 23 Wn.2d 754, 162 P.2d 284 (1945).
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complicated when an employer is engaged in two operations, one cov-
ered and the other not covered, and a single employee has duties which
carry him into both departments or operations. The cases dearly es-
tablish the rule that the employee must be engaged in covered work at
the time of his injury to be entitled to compensation." This is some-
times called the "pinpoint" rule. A few illustrative cases will demon-
strate the difficulty which the court has encountered in applying this
rule.
In Everett v. Department of Labor and Industries,2 referred to ear-
lier, the employee had duties which required him to work part of his
time at a waterworks plant and part of the time he was required to
collect accounts due the employer. He was shot and killed while at-
tempting to collect an old account when he remonstrated the debtor
for pilfering water from another's outlet. The court found that Everett
(the employee) was engaged in covered employment at the time of the
injury because collecting accounts was "inseparably interwoven with,
and a part of" the operation of the waterworks, and thus his widow was
entitled to compensation under the Act. In this case, the pin-point rule
was given a broad construction, making coverage co-extensive with the
workman's entire course of employment, and apparently taking the
"employer's business" approach to coverage of the workman at the
time of injury.
This liberal view of the right to compensation was soon re-examined
in Denny v. Department of Labor and Industries."8 There the em-
ployee's duties required him to solicit freight business in the morning,
and in the afternoon he worked in the warehouse itself, moving and
handling freight. The court again used the language of the classification
of occupations, and found "team and truckdriving (includes all ware-
houses operated by transfer companies)" and "auto freight transpor-
2 1 in D'Amico v. Conquista, 24 Wn2d 674, 167 P.2d 157 (1946), the court set
out four conditions wich must exist at the time of an injury in order to entitle one
to the benefits of the act. "First, the relationship of employer and employee must exist
between the injured person and lus employer (excpt in some cases where the injured
person is an independent contractor) ; second, the injured person must be in the course
of his employment; third, that the employee must be in the actual performance of the
duties required by the contract of employment; and fourth, the work being done must
be such as to require payment of industrial insurance premiums or assessments." Id. at
679, 167 P2d at 160. The injury, however, need not have been caused by a hazardinherent in the business or occupation. See Everett v. Department of Labor and In-
dustries, note 4 supra (shooting), Stertz v. Industrial Insurance Commission, 91
Wash. 588, 158 Pac. 256 (1916) (shooting), Boeing Aircraft Company v. Depart-
ment of Labor and Industries, 22 Wn2d 423, 156 P.2d 640 (1945) (aircraft crashing
into meat packing plant); Comment, 20 WAsHi. L. REv. 150 (1945).
22 See note 4 supra.
28 172 Wash. 631, 21 P.2d 275 (1933).
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tation" to be covered employment. Denny had not yet begun hIs after-
noon work, and was injured when he fell from a chair in the office of
the warehouse. After an extensive discussion of the problem, the court
held that Denny was not engaged in covered employment at the time of
his injury and therefore was not entitled to compensation for his in-
jury Denny's counsel had relied on the Everett case, but the court
held that Denny's duties of soliciting freight were not "essentially a
part of the business of auto freight transportation. 24
When the employee's activity in the Denny case is compared with the
work done by the employee in the Everett case, the difficulty of deter-
mining the right to compensation when the employee is injured while
engaged in work not directly related to the hazards of the enumerat-
ed business or occupation becomes apparent. In almost any case where
an employee is temporarily separated from the hazards of a particular
business or occupation, but still within the course of his employment, it
could be asserted that the employee's duties were "incidental to, inti-
mately connected with, and essentially a part of" the occupation clas-
sified as extrahazardous." Otherwise, why would the employee be
hired to perform the work? On the other hand, if it can be shown, as
in the Denny case, that there is a "clear line of demarcation" between
his duties close to the hazards of the business and his duties away from
those hazards, the employee will not be entitled to compensation if he
is injured while performing the latter, although he is within the course
of his employment. This state of the law is unsatisfactory because of
the uncertainty in determining the right to compensation when an em-
ployee is injured, and because of the difficulty in determimng a proper
insurance premium to be assessed against the employer for the hours of
employees engaged in such dual employment. A rule which finds an
employee flitting in and out of coverage several times a day as his duties
change their character, regardless of whether insurance payments have
been made for the workman's time, should be abandoned or changed in
favor of a rule which promotes certainty, and bears some reasonable
relation to an actual insurance program based on premiums paid for
the workman's time at work.
This question arose again in Morris v. Department of Labor and In-
dustries." Morris and another man were in charge of a branch office of
24 Id. at 643, 21 P 2d at 279.
25 Everett v. Department of Labor and Industries, 167 Wash. 619, 625, 9P.2d 1107,
1109 (1932).
26 179 Wash. 423, 38 P.2d 395 (1934).
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an electric power company. His duties included outside installation and
service work, and also the securing of new contracts and making col-
lections. On the day of his injury, while Morris was on 24-hour storm
call, he was directed to contact the operator of a motion picture thea-
ter to secure a contract for power. He did so in the evening, and while
there he attended the movie with a young lady friend. After the show
Morris was driving home on the same route which he would have tak-
en had he not stayed for the movie, and was injured when his car was
crowded off the highway by another car. When he appealed from the
Department's denial of his claim for compensation, the court said that
when an employee has two phases of his job, one of which is in cov-
ered work, and one of which is not, he is entitled to compensation even
when temporarily engaged in the non-covered work, if those duties are
"incidental to, intimately connected with, and essentially a part of"2
the occupation classified by the statute as covered employment. The
court approved both the Everett and Denny cases, found Morris to be
within the rule of the former, and held that he was entitled to compen-
sation.
At least three other cases have reached the Supreme Court where
the employee's duties involved both covered and non-covered work, and
the injury occurred when the employee was temporarily away from the
hazards of the covered occupation. 8 All three were automobile accident
cases, and in each the injured employee failed to bring himself within
the rule of the Everett and Morris cases and was denied compensation.
Muck v. Snohomislz County PUD,9 previously discussed, differs
from the other dual activity cases in two ways. First, while Muck was
employed generally in non-covered employment, his injury occurred
when he was in proximity to the hazards for which a covered occupa-
tion is classified. Second, Muck apparently was not regularly engaged
in installing radios, but rather his normal duties were those of a sales
manager in an appliance store, not covered by the statute enumerating
included occupations. Muck's widow was found not entitled to Work-
man's Compensation benefits and therefore could maintain the action
for negligence, because, although Muck was apparently within the
27 Id. at 430, 38 P 2d at 39728 Maeda v. Department of Labor and Industries, 192 Wash. 87, 72 P.2d 1034
(1937), Hill v. Department of Labor and Industries, 174 Wash. 571, 25 P.2d 568(1934), Sheldon v. Department of Labor and Industries, 168 Wash. 571, 12 P.2d 751
(1923), but see Lunday v. Department of Labor and Industries, 200 Wash. 620, 94
P.2d 744 (1939).
29 See note 1 supra.
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scope of his employment when killed, he was not "engaged in duties
required of him either by his contract of employment or by specific
direction of his employer.)'s°
The court disposed of Muck's right to compensation by approving
the jury's finding that he was a volunteer while engaged in the covered
work, but the necessary inference is that if the jury had found that
he had been directed to engage in such work by his employer, and was
injured while so engaged, his widow would be entitled to compensa-
tion for his death and would be foreclosed from suing at common law,
even though her husband had engaged in covered employment only on
rare occasions, for a short time only, and no premiums had been paid
to the accident fund for his hours in covered employment. The right
to compensation in such a case would be unrelated to normal ideas of
insurance coverage after the payment of premiums, because of the ad-
ministrative difficulty of bringing a person under the existing program
when he spends only a few hours per year in covered employment.
In discussing some possible solutions to the problems raised by these
cases, the author hastens to add that there are other questions of equal
or greater importance arising from the Act which are beyond the scope
of this comment. For instance, the right to compensation of persons
hired to engage in covered work for a limited period of time has
Leached the Supreme Court in two recent cases."' The present case law
denies compensation to persons hired to build a house or a boat for an
employer not engaged in that business, even though the employer is
engaged in another business which is covered.82 These cases generally
use the "employer's business" approach, and base the denial of com-
pensation on the fact that the employee cannot qualify as a "work-
man" because he is not hired by an "employer" as defined by the Act.3"
The clearest and best solution to the problems raised by the dual ac-
tivity cases would be to extend the coverage of the act, presently ap-
plying only to "extrahazardous" work and occupations, to include the
80 41 Wn.2d 81, 85, 247 P.2d 233, 235 (1952)
31 Craine v. Department of Labor and Industries, 19 Wn.2d 75, 141 P.2d 129(1943), Nyland v. Department of Labor and Industries, 41 Wn2d 511, 250 P.2d 551
(1952).
82 See note 3 supra.
83 See notes 6 and 7 supr. The independent contractor's right to compensation is
also beyond the scope of this comment. See the dissenting opinion per Grady, J., in
Craine v. Department of Labor and Industries, 19 Wn.2d 75, 141 P.2d 129 (1943).
Also see Koreski v. Seattle Hardware Company, 17 Wn.2d 421, 135 P.2d 860 (1943)
and Latimer v. Western Machinery Exchange, 40 Wn.2d 115, 241 P.2d 923 (1952) re-
versed on rehearing, 142 Wash. Dec. 693 (1953), regarding the right of a self-employed
person who has elected not to come under the act to sue a covered employer at common
law.
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employees of all employers who hire a certain minimum number of em-
ployees. When the Washington act was originally enacted in 1911, there
was substantial doubt as to the constitutionality of legislation by states
which interfered with the relations between employer and employee.
For this reason, the compulsory coverage of the act was limited to "ex-
trahazardous" employments, and elective coverage was provided for all
other work and occupations. In 1917, this fear of unconstitutionality
proved unfounded,"' and since that time only one state has adopted
this limitation, 5 two have removed it,"" and two others have modified
their statutes so as to have general 'coverage in effect.' Compulsory
coverage in Washington and eight other states is still limited to "ex-
trahazardous" occupations.'8 An overwhelming number of states pro-
vide general coverage of employments, usually excluding only farm
and domestic labor, casual employment and work not in the employ-
er's trade or business, and employees in firms with less than a certain
inimum number of employees." While it may not be possible pres-
ently to bring Washington in line with most of the other states, it is
submitted that the limitation of coverage to "extrahazardous" employ-
ments has long since outlived its usefulness, is responsible for confusion
and uncertainty as to coverage, and should be abandoned in favor of
more general coverage .of businesses and occupations.
If the act should continue to be limited to "extrahazardous" busi-
nesses and occupations, still the statute should take a consistent and
understandable approach to coverage. As already pointed out, the
statute suggests the "employer's business" approach, while the cases
make it clear that the "employee's activity" may bring an employee
(and the employer, as to him) within the act. It is suggested that both
approaches could be used together in determining coverage. Some
businesses or industries can easily be established as units, and those
intended to be included could be enumerated in the statute, and all em-
ployees engaged in the employment of such an industry could be
brought within the compulsory provisions of the act. To increase cer-
tainty and more clearly accomplish the purpose of the act, the employee
"6 New York Central Ry. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667(1917).
"3 New Mexico.
"e Arizona, New Hampshire.
'7 New York Illinois; 1 LARSON, WOXMn''S COMPENSATION § 55.10 (1952).
8Washington, RCW 51.12.010 [RRS § 7674a]; Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Wyoming, 1 LARsoN, Wonmr zs COm-
PENSA17ON § 55.10 (1952).
"9 2 LARsoN, Woam='s COzPENSATiON, Appendix A, Table 3 (1952).
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should be entitled to compensation regardless of the nature of his work,
and should be relieved of the requirement that he be engaged in work
which is related to the hazards for which the industry or business is
classified at the time of the injury'" The rules for determining the
course or scope of employment are fairly well established, and cover-
age based on this suggestion would be much easier to define than if
based on the scope of "extrahazardous" employment, which is the pres-
ent criterion. The fundamental reasons for compensation coverage
apply equally whether an employee is injured while operating a ma-
chine or sitting in a chair. The general rule in other states limiting cov-
erage to "extrahazardous" employments is in accord with this sugges-
tion, and the period of coverage would more nearly coincide with the
period for which industrial insurance premiums are paid."
In businesses which are not to be included as a unit because they
are generally of a non-hazardous character, or not appropriate units
for Workmen's Compensation coverage, but where some of the em-
ployees are engaged in occupations which should be included, the "em-
ployee activity" approach to coverage could be used to supplement the
business coverage just suggested, and a comprehensive, authoritative
list of included occupations could be set out by the statute. Here the
"pin-point rule" should be retained, because its removal would create
a problem equally as great with respect to dual activity as presently
exists. For instance, if that rule were abandoned, the sales manager
of an appliance store who only occasionally engages in covered employ-
ment would be automatically covered for all of his time, a result which
would surprise both the employer, the employee and the Department
of Labor and Industries. Where the employee's activity is the basis of
coverage, the retention of the pin-point rule would actually enhance
the certainty of coverage, because the scope of the employee's covered
duties would be set out by the statute.'2
In the fact situation suggested by Muck v. Snohomish County
PUD,48 where an employee only occasionally and infrequently engages
40 The Federal Employer's Liability Act, 35 STAT. 65 (1908) as amended 45 U.S.C.
§§ 951-60, removed the pmo-point rule by the 1939 amendment. Even in Washington,
compensation is not denied because the injury was not caused by a hazard related to the
employment. See note 21 supra.
4" 1 LARSON, WORKMENS COMPENSATION § 55.33 (1952), RIESENELD AND MAX-
WELL, MODERN SociA. LEGISLATION 188-190 (1950).
42 New York uses the employee's activity to determine coverage when the employer
has less than four employees. Gramlich v. Board of Education, 297 N.Y. 349, 79 N.E.
2d. 437 (1948).
48 See note 1 supra. The court held that the jury had found that Muck was not so
engaged.
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in covered work, the problem of the right to compensation becomes
acute. The law gives workmen the right to compensation from the
state accident fund automatically when they are injured in covered em-
ployment, regardless of the fact that the employer has not complied
with the act and paid premiums for the employee's time. Compensa-
tion is not a gratuity from the state, but is paid from contributions by
the employers who engage in covered work. This type of case is the
hardest to reconcile with an insurance program, because of the ad-
ministrative difficulty in collecting premiums for the employee's time.
The workman should be covered by the Act, but when the employer
has failed to comply with the Act, the cost of the injury must fall either
on the rest of the employers in the class by an increased basic premium
rate, or on the employer by way of penalties and increased cost experi-
ence. If he discontinues the employment of men engaged in covered
work, he may be able to avoid the latter. To find the workman not
entitled to compensation defeats the purposes of the Act, and raises the
problem "when is an employee 'only occasionally' engaged in extra-
hazardous work?" Under the present system of coverage, it is proba-
bly better to find such an employee entitled to- compensation if he is
engaged in covered work in the course of his employment at the time
of his injury.
It seems that in any event, so long as coverage is limited to "extra-
hazardous" employments, these dual capacity cases will continue to
present difficult problems, both in fact and law, concerning coverage.
The suggested changes are at best only stop-gap measures, to improve
the position of the employee and his employer by making the right to
compensation broader and more certain within the framework of the
present limited coverage system. Only when coverage is extended to
the employee's entire scope of employment will the problem of dual
capacity be eliminated." If Workmen's compensation is a desirable in-
stitution as an alternative to the evils of common law litigation between
employer and employee, then a broadening of the statutes to cover
more employees in more varied occupations for a greater portion (if
not all) of their working time is also desirable to more nearly provide
the "sure and certain relief for workmen, injured in extrahazardous
work.., regardless of questions of fault.. ." which is the primary ob-
jective of the act."'
"Except where the employee has two employers. See, e.g., Lunday v. Department
of Labor and Industries, 200 Wash. 620, 94 P2d 744 (1939).
45 RCW 51.04.010 [RRS § 7673].
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